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TRANSLATION, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 
Toby Osborne 
 
The scholarly discipline of International Relations [IR] has often characterised diplomacy from 
the viewpoint of the ‘state’ as an abstract entity, and correspondingly as a description of the 
ways states manage their interactions with each other.1  But ‘diplomacy’ can also be understood 
fundamentally as a social practice dependent on people who operate not as empty shells, but 
as distinctive individuals with personalities and identities. While scholars have certainly 
described states metaphorically as ‘individuals’, or as ‘actors’, a socially constructed view of 
diplomacy that takes its practitioners seriously, by definition, entails looking at interactions 
between individual people, with their personal identities and characteristics, acting as 
representatives of others, including (though not necessarily exclusively) ‘states’.  As a practice 
that is essentially about human interactions and personalities, it is entirely understandable that 
diplomacy has always entailed complex cultural negotiations and the translations of different 
languages and codes.  These ‘languages’ are the focus of this essay.  In some senses, diplomatic 
negotiations encompass literal translation, of how people communicate across linguistic 
divides, and of how the very acts of linguistic translation involve compromises of various sorts 
(e.g. Federici and Tessicini 2014).2 Following this, ‘translation’ might also reflect how 
professionalised diplomatic corps acquire shared languages and terminologies that they 
recognise amongst themselves, almost as a private language, as Harold Nicolson argued in his 
classic account of diplomacy (Nicolson 1965: Chapter X).3 But this essay also encompasses 
translation metaphorically: of the symbolic acts of translation, that is, of interpreting different 
cultural codes and of the search for shared understandings of such fundamental issues as 
diplomatic protocols or material gifts as foundational for building stable grounds for 
negotiating. 
These issues have been a key element of diplomatic practice throughout history, 
though this essay examines them by focusing on European diplomacy during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. It examines first the normative view of early modern diplomacy at the 
level of formal practice and the challenges posed to peaceful interactions by the changing 
political and cultural landscapes of Europe and the world, and in the second half of the essay 
of how Europeans grappled in practice with these challenges. The early modern period is 
especially interesting and significant for historians of diplomacy since has often been taken to 
represent the most dynamic and paradigmatic period in the evolution of diplomatic practice, 
when the structures of ‘modern’ diplomacy came into being, and when European ‘diplomacy’ 
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became increasingly globalised.4 The period, it is customarily argued, witnessed the evolution 
of resident ambassadors, that is to say, of ambassadors who lived abroad for long periods of 
time, in turn changing how rulers and states interacted precisely because of sustained contact 
with one another (even though in reality the spread of ‘permanent diplomacy’ was neither even 
nor linear across Europe). Powers had to articulate codes of behaviour for ambassadors, and 
also recognise, and broadly accept, practices of immunity, in part out of mutual respect and 
self-interest, for establishing orderly and peaceful conduct. This in turn was connected with a 
second important theme of early modern diplomacy. It has been argued that the period saw the 
increasingly defined connection between diplomacy and sovereignty, where ‘diplomacy’ as a 
formal practice itself became the monopolistic preserve of rulers or states and that, at least by 
the later seventeenth century, these sovereign powers were recognised as legitimate.5 
 
1. The breakdown of shared languages of diplomacy in the early modern world 
Most importantly for this essay, though, normative diplomatic practice, from its European 
standpoint at the level of ‘high politics’, had to account for a series of profound, and contrary, 
cultural changes during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which potentially threatened 
the basis on which powers could interact peacefully (in the very period, as mentioned above, 
when diplomatic practice was nevertheless becoming more widely normalised).  According to 
historians of international law, the idea of a single diplomatic community—the respublica 
christiana, as it has been termed—with shared cultural languages and which supposedly 
defined Europe in clear terms during the middle ages, was badly damaged by the Reformation 
that followed Martin Luther’s protest against the Roman Church from 1517.6 Whatever 
changes were taking place in terms of the spread of permanent diplomacy and ideas of 
immunity, religious hatred and confessional violence became hallmarks of the period, as the 
effective breakdown of Christendom's unity in the sixteenth century severely damaged the basis 
on which Europeans could trust each other on the international stage. 
Catholics, as the inheritors of the respublica christiana, viewed Protestants—heretics, 
from the Catholic perspective—as fundamentally untrustworthy. The capacity of Protestants to 
operate according to the norms of Christian behaviour, as defined by Catholics, was felt to have 
been deeply compromised by their rejection of ‘true’ religion. According to the principles by 
tradition accepted by the Catholic Church, Protestants had forfeited their rights to membership 
of civilised society, including, we might assume by extension, the international society of rulers 
and states.  What is more, since Protestants were ‘heretics’, it was often argued that they were 
almost pathologically incapable of being trustworthy. Their words and actions simply could 
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not be taken as reliable for any sustained period.7 If diplomacy within Europe had, in effect, 
been a shared language prior to the Reformation, held together by a common religion and by 
commonly respected supranational authorities (principally the Roman Church), then 
Europeans, in theory at least, could no longer meaningfully or peacefully talk to each other in 
formal diplomatic frameworks. It is telling, in particular, that there were virtually no direct 
diplomatic contacts at an official level between Protestants and the papacy from the sixteenth 
century until at least the eighteenth century.8 The papacy remained ostensibly intransigent in 
its refusal to engage through official diplomacy with Protestants after the Reformation, 
something which arguably resulted in a decline in its international authority as a recognised 
diplomatic actor and mediator. Conversely, the British government, for instance, only 
considered sending a representative specifically to the pope at the outbreak of the First World 
War, and the first full British ambassador to the papacy dated only to 1982. 
For an example of how serious the challenge to formal diplomacy and peace-making 
might be in the post-Reformation world, we can look to one of the key practices of international 
relations throughout history, the signing of treaties. Treaties, most importantly peace treaties, 
between rulers or states entailed the mutual recognition of sovereignty, that is to say they 
required the acceptance that the other side was authorised to engage in formal diplomacy.9 
International peace treaties in Europe also, by tradition, at least until the seventeenth century, 
entailed recognised protocols of ratification, alongside oath-swearing invoking God, which 
correspondingly implied that treaty partners shared a common understanding of religion as a 
cultural glue and, equally, that they could notionally accept each other's words as credible and 
trustworthy. Did the Reformation thus necessitate novel forms of diplomatic practice? More 
particularly, could Catholic sovereign powers trust Protestants, as a new presence in 
international politics, when it came to the formalities of concluding wars and ratifying 
settlements with oaths, assuming that Protestants were even accepted as legitimate in the first 
place? 
These kinds of questions faced by Europeans were not entirely novel, not least as 
Christian Europeans and Islamic powers had long grappled with how they might conclude 
treaties. The bilingual treaties between Muslim lords and conquering Aragonese kings in the 
thirteenth century illustrate some of the cultural, and political, gaps that seemingly existed. In 
effect, the Al-Azraq Treaty of 1245, (the manuscript of which uniquely survives and is possibly 
representative of other, now-lost, treaties) reveals very different understandings of what a 
settlement actually meant for the negotiating parties. Its interlineal text, combining Arabic and 
Aragonese-influenced Castillian, shows that the two sides actually approached peace with 
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markedly different mentalities (Burns and Chevedden 2000). In a parallel example, James 
Muldoon has claimed in discussing the peace offered by the Muslim Tatars to the Christian 
king, Bela IV of Hungary (r. 1235-70) that, 
 
The oaths that both the tartars and Hungarians would take to seal an alliance would 
have no meaning because the infidel tartars would not feel bound by oaths sworn on 
Christian relics: ‘infidels’, since they do not possess the true faith, certainly cannot be 
bound by oaths whose sanction was the judgement of the Christian God (Muldoon 
1979, 60). 
 
Following Muldoon’s point, one solution, at least, to ensure that treaty partners would honour 
agreements, was to swear oaths on respective sacred objects as a symbolic act that would be 
comprehensible and relevant to all parties—based of course on the assumption that the parties 
recognised what kinds of ritual objects mattered to each other. The practice had already been 
used on certain occasions prior to the Reformation. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (an early 
English history dating first from the late-ninth century), for example, recorded that a peace 
agreement in 876 between Christian Anglo-Saxon rulers and pagan Danes had been sworn on 
the Danes’ sacred temple-ring (Swanton 1996, 74-5; Chaplais 2003, 31-2). Similarly, a 
seventeenth century treatise on diplomacy, Gasparo Braggiacia’s L’ambasciatore in sei libri 
(1626), one example from the outpouring of normative literature about diplomacy produced at 
the time, reflected (albeit in his case from a pointedly Catholic perspective) on whether it was 
licit for Christians to accept oaths sworn on the Qur’an in agreements made with Ottomans 
(Bragaccia 1627, 361). Clearly, Europeans were grappling with questions about whether 
diplomacy might take place in ways that were meaningful and binding to them across difficult 
conceptual boundaries, and whether certain objects or protocols might acquire a shared value 
by powers from different cultural traditions. And behind this was a series of other moral debates 
within pre-modern Europe about whether the quest for peace, as a traditional diplomatic ideal, 
was of such great value that it might trump other moral qualms, such as whether, from a 
European Christian perspective, peace with ‘others’ could ever be reliable and lasting.10 
As Braggaccia’s treatise suggests, at the very time when Europeans were engaging 
with difficult questions amongst themselves about the interplay between diplomacy, identity 
and legitimacy, diplomacy was itself becoming globalised on a much more sustained level than 
beforehand. Quite apart from the ongoing interactions between Christian powers in the Latin 
West and Muslim powers in the near east, notably, the Ottomans and Persians, there was also 
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a growing level of contact between Europeans and powers from Africa and Asia. It was during 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, for example, that the first ‘ambassadors’ from 
Africa and Asia came to Europe, while Europeans began to send their own representatives to 
those non-European powers, as will be discussed later (e.g. Lowe 2001; Martínez Ferrer and 
Nocca 2003; Massarella 2012). 
These cross-cultural relations between European Christians and non-Christian, non-
Europeans, at the macro-level of formal diplomacy, had a backstory for Europeans that 
predated the early modern period, as we have already seen with the issue of peace treaties.  
There had been centuries of diplomatic contact between Latin Christians and Muslims, most 
notably. In the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV Fieschi (r. 1243-54) had elaborated a legal 
basis for interacting with non-Christian societies, principally Islamic powers, arguing that 
Christians could not legitimately invade their territories simply because they did not accept the 
‘true’ faith as understood by Catholics. In turn, this generated a broader series of arguments 
that had significance for the ways in which Christians engaged diplomatically with other 
peoples. One of Innocent IV’s followers, Hostiensis (d. 1271), who was himself a canon 
theologian, took the contrary view to his master, by arguing that those who were not in a state 
of grace (in effect, non-Catholics from their perspective) forfeited their dominium, that is to 
say their rights to exercise authority, a point later reiterated by the English theologian John 
Wyclif (c. 1324-84). But this was rejected at the eighth session of the Church’s Council of 
Constance (May 1415), fearful of the consequences for the Church’s own claim to authority if 
it were seen to lose, even temporarily, its state of grace. In effect, the council’s decision against 
Hostiensis affirmed the legitimacy of non-Christian powers, and by extension the capacity for 
Christians to negotiate with them. It is worth adding that a similar argument, with explicit 
reference to the Council of Constance, was later used by the Spanish Thomist, Francisco de 
Vitoria (c. 1485-1546), in a lecture of 1539 delivered at the University of Salamanca (his classic 
work addressing the moral questions associated with Spanish colonial power), in which he 
justified the property rights of American Indians (Muldoon 1979, 5-9; Muldoon 1980; Pagden 
and Lawrence 1991, 240-3). 
The significance for this essay of these debates about the existential identities of non-
Christians lies in the fact that, from the standpoint of the Latin West, attempts were made 
conceptually to understand how to bridge cultural divides and to accept that non-Christian 
societies might be accorded diplomatic recognition in terms acceptable, or recognisable, to 
Christians. There was an evident understanding that so-called ‘infidels’ exhibited the markers 
of civilisation as understood in Europe, a fundamental prerequisite for meaningful diplomatic 
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engagement: a respect for the other, even if the religious and cultural differences remained.11  
Indeed, it should be added that the inverse could also be true. Muhammad ibn ‘Uthmān al-
Miknāsī, a Muslim ambassador active in Europe during the later eighteenth century, and author 
of an important set of travel writings, while evidently disliking Euro-Christian ‘infidels’, could 
nevertheless pursue negotiations with a degree of pragmatism and equanimity (Matar 2015). 
Even the language of ‘friendship’ could be found in agreements signed between 
Christian and Islamic powers. For example, an agreement of August 1535, the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Charles V, undertook to protect the restored bey of Tunis, Mulay Hassan, marking a 
‘perpetual friendship…peace and mutual closeness’ between the two.12 This is worth 
emphasising. ‘Friendship’, as a word, was heavily loaded in pre-modern European diplomatic 
discourse, and was commonly deployed in formal treaties and alliances (Lesaffer 2002). It 
implied, from the Christian perspective at least, mutual recognition, even, so it seems in this 
case, across clear cultural boundaries.13 
So far, then we have seen that the cultural challenges to European practices of 
diplomacy, at a formal level, were twofold. The first was felt specifically within ‘Europe’, as 
different confessional communities had to find new ways, or perhaps rearticulate old ways, of 
engaging with each other in a context where mutual trust had been severely damaged, and 
where conflict was consequently increased. The second challenge was of finding ways for 
Europeans to engage with powers who were simply outside the framework of Christianity. In 
terms of the challenge within Europe, the search for shared diplomatic languages evidently 
took time and required some difficult moral compromises, especially for Catholics who felt 
that they were the legitimate guardians of the old Latin West. The first peace treaty between 
Protestants and Catholics, for example, only dated to the 1604 Treaty of London, agreed 
between the Stuart king of England, James I (r. 1603-25), and Philip III of Spain (r. 1598-
1622)—close to ninety years after Martin Luther made his stand against Rome that precipitated 
what we know as the Reformation. When the two parties came to the formal ratification of their 
treaty, inevitably some ground had to be conceded on matters of practice, so as to avoid some 
confessional difficulties. The peace was ratified both in London and in Valladolid (Castile), 
where the Spanish court was at that period located. Customarily, peace treaties between 
Christians had been finalised with oaths on the bible and often with the celebration of Mass, an 
act that conferred peace-making with a semi-sacramental authority that was comprehensible to 
all parties. While James I swore his oath ratifying the treaty on a Vulgate Bible (he was, after 
all, a baptised Catholic, even though he was a Protestant by confession), the peace ratification 
in Spain generated problems. Given the bitterly irreconcilable differences between Protestant 
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and Catholics over the meaning of the Eucharist, the peace in Spain was finalised in a specially 
designated secular space, clearly in an effort to defuse a potential problem of mutual trust.14 
 
2. Bridging divides in the early modern world: alternative diplomacies 
The English and Spanish clearly demonstrated that they were capable of compromising their 
ideological concerns to ensure that confessional mis-translations in the act of peace-making 
were minimised. One of the reasons why peace was in any case made easier between England 
and Spain during James I’s reign, though, was that he was himself married to a Catholic queen, 
Anna of Denmark. The case of England’s diplomacy during the early seventeenth century 
indeed points us to alternative articulations of ‘high’ diplomacy that could bridge ostensibly 
large cultural or religious divides within Europe. It is certainly striking that from James I until 
James II (r. 1685-88), England had a succession of Catholic consorts, aside from the republican 
period of 1649-60 (in turn, Anne of Denmark, Henrietta Maria, Catherine of Braganza and 
Mary of Modena). While relations between princely husbands and wives were not always 
smooth, precisely because of confessional and political differences, these consorts nonetheless 
enabled a closer degree of integration between England and the continent that might otherwise 
have been the case. The presence of Catholic queens opened-up alternative ways of doing 
diplomacy and secondary channels for negotiations between England and Catholic powers on 
the continent. Henrietta Maria, for example, facilitated informal diplomatic contacts between 
the Stuart court and the papacy during the 1630s (though this was also the cause of suspicion 
in England) (Hibbard 1983). More generally, dynastic unions have always been a staple of 
European diplomacy, a means for making peace between rulers. We should not forget that 
marriage was itself a sacrament in Catholic Europe, and could act as a powerful articulation of 
obligation and friendship on the international stage (Russell 1986, 85-9; Bély 1999, especially 
chapters VIII and XII; Ffolliott, 2000). 
Marriage as a distinctive form of international peace-making—that is to say as a kind 
of symbolic diplomatic language in its own right—in turn raises a different set of questions 
about how diplomacy worked and, by a further extension, about how we understand the very 
notion of ‘diplomacy’ as a sovereign prerogative. So far, this account of cultural translation has 
been framed by the roles played at the level of princes and states. Equally, it has assumed—
working from the premises set on a macro and normative level by scholars of legal history—
that there were clearly defined, and importantly clearly distinct, cultural communities, 
principally, in this context, the Latin West. Princes were of course individual people and their 
diplomatic representatives were increasingly seen as the embodiments of princes, almost as 
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princes in absentia. Furthermore, since, as was claimed at the very outset of this essay, 
diplomacy is fundamentally about individual social interactions, we should also take close 
account of the practitioners, those who did the diplomacy on behalf of their sovereign masters. 
Looking at diplomacy from their perspectives adds important dimensions to an 
understanding of how diplomacy could bridge different kinds of divides (religious, political, 
linguistic), and of diplomacy as an act of cultural translation. It furthermore re-aligns attention 
from thinking only in a narrow sense about formal practices of diplomacy that have constituted 
traditional diplomatic history, or the broad categorisations employed in legal history of 
seemingly rigid legal communities (notably the respublica christiana), to the multiplicity of 
ways negotiations actually took place in practice. Taking a more personalised and organic 
approach to diplomacy in turn encompasses the ‘connected histories’ that, so it has been 
reasonably argued, existed between peoples in a global context, pointing us to the rich variety 
and frequency of cultural translations that took place aside from (or perhaps in spite of) the 
formal levels of state relations in the early modern world (e.g., Subrahmanyam 1997; Ghobrial, 
2013). 
While the gradual monopolisation of diplomacy by princes and their states entailed a 
parallel ‘professionalisation’ of diplomacy as a career, this was by no means entirely settled in 
the early modern period, even into the seventeenth century (the time by which scholars hitherto 
often assumed that ‘modern’ diplomacy had effectively been established). There were in fact a 
range of individuals who operated as practitioners of diplomacy in Europe and further afield, 
including (though not exclusively) merchants, artists, missionaries, translators, and women.  
This range of diplomatic actors facilitated diplomacy across different divides, precisely by 
virtue of their semi-formal or informal roles: they allowed greater flexibility for ‘states’ and 
princes to pursue peace where more formal contacts might have been problematic (Von 
Thiessen and Windler 2010; Van Gelder and Krstić 2015). We can get a sense of this by looking 
at the kinds of roles artists, as one category, played as cross-cultural diplomats. After all, they 
had the kinds of skills that enabled them to move around Europe and potentially to switch 
between different identities, since, especially as portraitists, they were often experienced at 
engaging and communicating with patrons and sitters. Marika Keblusek has put this neatly in 
describing artists as ‘double agents’, who combined their creative expertise that was so valued 
by princes and courts, with their capacity to slip in and out of diplomacy (Keblusek 2011; see 
also Duerloo and Smuts 2016). 
Strikingly, art historians have also applied linguistic terminology and philosophy to 
describe the potential power of paintings as symbolic, and even constitutive, forms of 
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diplomacy. Thus, paintings might act as ‘mute diplomats’, articulating ideas and political 
rhetoric through visual metaphors and imagery in ways that mimicked the vocalised oratory of 
ambassadors, and which could be understood commonly across more obvious linguistic 
divides. Paintings, as a privileged ‘language’, might indeed have the capacity to go beyond 
what official ambassadors might reasonably or tactfully say themselves (Colantuono 2000).  
Paintings might also serve as performative utterances, as the art historian Ulrich Heinen has 
argued with reference to Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640). Drawing on linguistic philosophy, 
Heinen suggests that Rubens created paintings with the intention of affecting political decisions 
by eliciting specific responses from their audiences as part of a process of peace-making 
(Heinen 2011). In effect, paintings generate perlocutionary results.15 
Rubens stands out as probably the outstanding example of someone who doubled as 
both a painter and a diplomat, his career reaching its apogee during the Thirty Years War (1618-
48), the war that engulfed much of Europe and indeed which in some respects was the first 
global war. His involvement, as a semi-official diplomatic agent on behalf of the Spanish, in 
negotiations, from 1627-30, to end a war between England and Spain, was grounded on his 
reputation as an artist, and the appeal he had to the English king Charles I (r. 1625-49) and his 
minister-favourite, the Duke of Buckingham (1592-1628). Thus, Rubens’s paintings were used 
as forms of cultural communication, as acts of diplomacy in their own right, in part as gifts to 
bridge divides. The artist himself even become a gift. Rubens was arguably valuable because 
he could be used as form of flattery: his very person carried symbolic capital, and as much, if 
not greater, weight, than his actual negotiating skills (Auwers 2013). Here, the visual arts, and 
the artists who created material objects, provided a shared cultural language that was able to 
transcend the hard boundaries of politics and religion that ostensibly existed between England 
and Spain.16 
Artists were not unique as actors who might facilitate cross-cultural diplomacy, using 
particular skill sets to by-pass more formal communication channels that might otherwise have 
been blocked by significant cultural, religious, or political divisions. To take another example, 
merchants by their very nature obviously moved around for trade. Their mobility, coupled with 
the fact that it was often in the interests of merchant companies to maintain various lines of 
communication in different political contexts, provided them with both the capacity and 
incentive to assume diplomatic functions, as another category of semi-official ambassadors. In 
some cases, then, merchant-diplomacy took the form of individual merchants operating on 
behalf of their native European states; in others, this entailed mercantile companies, such as 
the Dutch and British East Indies Companies, taking on diplomatic roles.  In fact, they were so 
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powerful that they assumed some of the characteristics of states themselves (Weststeijn 2014; 
Stern 2011). In the parlance of contemporary IR, as sub-national communities with the capacity 
to operate their own diplomatic agendas aside from the kinds of agendas and restrictions of 
‘states’, they were engaging in ‘para-diplomacy’.17 Given the relative weakness of European 
states beyond Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it seems entirely 
understandable that mercantile companies, who had their own interests at stake in maintaining 
and developing economic relations with communities outside Europe, should seek to develop. 
Christina Brauner’s work on diplomacy between merchants and African powers, especially in 
the Gold Coast, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, is revealing in this regard, 
where she explores the various ways the different interest groups and individuals interacted in 
part through gift exchanges (Brauner 2016). It furthermore reminds us of the importance of 
material culture as a language of diplomacy. As with the use of sacred objects for peacemaking 
(such as the Danish ring), or of paintings (in the case of Rubens), objects used in relations 
between European merchants and African powers were intended to ameliorate relations 
through their functions as culturally translatable objects. 
Artists and merchants thus represented two categories of informal cross-cultural 
diplomats. To take a third category, we can look at members of religious orders in the early 
modern period. Generally European by extraction, they could even play reverse roles as 
diplomats, representing non-European powers to European powers, as was the case in the 
example of the Safavid monarch, Shah Abbas (r. 1588-1629), who used members of the 
Augustinian and Carmelite orders as representatives to Europe during the first decades of the 
seventeenth century. Their value, clearly, was that they understood better than others the 
different cultural worlds between which they moved. As missionaries who crossed boundaries 
both ways, they might also complicate further the notion of rigidly delineated political 
communities hitherto described by historians of international relations. Indeed, the fact that we 
have examples of Europeans operating as diplomats for non-Europeans back into Europe 
directs attention to the intriguing phenomenon of individuals in the early modern world whose 
very identities straddled different communities, and who in themselves entwined cultures of 
diplomacy and translation.18 It might even be argued that all diplomats in effect purposefully 
inhabit and operate in the gaps between communities (or ‘states’) defined by their separateness, 
as the political scientist Paul Sharp has argued. In doing so, they act as cultural bridge-builders 
through their roles in mediating this ‘separateness’ (Sharp 2009).19   
More particularly, it can be added, in the early modern context, some of these 
transnational individuals assumed diplomatic identities because they were literally translators, 
  
11 
 
imbuing them with a privileged capacity to mediate. In the pre-modern world there was no 
single, accepted, international language. For understandable reasons, the actual practicalities 
of conversation and dialogue amongst Europeans was relatively unproblematic. At least until 
the seventeenth century, Latin remained a fairly common language, though French was 
becoming important in its own right. The challenges of managing interactions between 
Europeans and those from outside Europe were more complex, though not in practice 
insurmountable. On practical levels, various individuals who had language skills became 
potentially valued agencies of diplomacy. In the Mediterranean World of Spain and North 
Africa, for example, Christian and Muslim powers made use of various translators, such as 
Moroccan talbes and former captives, though not always without difficulties, given the 
challenges for the Spanish, for example, of finding reliable translators who could both speak 
and read Arabic (Féria Garcia 2007). Just as famously, the Ottoman Dragomans operated as 
cultural brokers who were able to straddle the different protocols of Ottoman and European 
diplomacy thanks to their ambiguous identities.20 Similarly, the case of one individual, Michel 
Antonio Corai (c. 1558- c. 1615), as explored by Federico Federici, provides important insights 
into how an individual whose culturally and ethnically cosmopolitan background, coupled with 
his linguistic abilities, provided him with the credentials to cross different kinds of cultural 
boundaries (Federici 2014). 
 
3. Diplomacy and cultural commensurability 
A series of key questions evidently thread through these discussions of diplomatic engagement 
between Europeans of different confessions, and between Europeans and non-Europeans, as 
this concluding section of the essay considers. Are cross-cultural diplomatic interactions 
fundamentally grounded on difference and misunderstanding? Did early modern diplomacy, 
by contrast, work in culturally relativistic frameworks, accepting the co-existence and equal 
validity of multiple communities? Alternatively, might diplomatic choices follow rational 
processes where actors recognise mutual interests and commonalities? In 1640, one of Spain’s 
leading ambassadors, Diego Saavedra Fajardo (1584-1648), published an advice manual 
dedicated to the king of Spain’s heir. In its own right, it was a major contribution to the genre 
of princely advice literature that were common in the early modern period, and in Catholic 
Europe in particular where theorists grappled with the challenge of articulating philosophies 
that squared religious conviction with practical political imperatives.21 Amongst the chapters 
of the work, written as a series of 100 moralising political emblems, was one devoted to the 
question of whether Catholics could trust those who did not share their faith. He began with an 
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image of Mount Vesuvius, which was active at the time he wrote his work. While everything 
on the surface appeared calm, so he wrote, beneath its cover the volcano was seething and 
readying to erupt. Thus, heretics and infidels might appear trustworthy on the outside, but 
beneath their surfaces they simmer with concealed wickedness.  However—and this is the key 
point—he added later in the chapter that  
 
Nations have no security of what they negotiate other than the religion of the oath.  
And if by this they attempt to deceive, commerce in the world would end, and it would 
not be possible to settle truces or peace agreements.  But even if there is no oath, 
treaties should be fulfilled, for from truth, fidelity and justice, there is born in those 
treaties an obligation that is reciprocal and common to all people.  And as one is not 
allowed to kill or hate a heretic, so neither is it allowed to cheat him, or to break a 
promise to him (Saavedra 1999, 971-2). 
 
Ostensibly, this passage seems to distil issues of diplomacy and cultural commensurability to 
a matter of rational choice that all parties might share—of doing to the other what you would 
have done to yourself as necessary for co-existence.  But does this also suggest that diplomacy 
works within natural law as a binding force common to all people? That might be the inference 
if we also look to the moral philosopher James Dunn, who has argued in a relevant essay on 
the concept of ‘trust’ that the force of a promise (of course fundamental to treaty-making) 
comes from a combination of voluntary self-commitment (arguably, a rational choice) and the 
psychological and social foundations of human collective life (Dunn 1996, 91). 
Opinions differ amongst scholars about the extent to which cross-cultural interactions 
have been shaped by differences: the question of cultural commensurability has been especially 
important, for example, in scholarship on early modern ‘ethnography’ (e.g. Schwartz 1994; 
Rubiés 2000). The theme of cultural commensurability and diplomacy also remains a concern 
in the field of IR too. In what has become a classic work of IR, Raymond Cohen has, for 
instance, argued for the need for diplomats to understand what he has seen as hard cultural 
differences. More specifically, Anglo-Saxon diplomatic culture (he is principally concerned 
with American diplomacy), so he argues, is primarily concerned with linguistic interactions. 
This ‘low context’, as Cohen terms it, stands in contrast with the ‘high context’, more 
symbolically-shaped cultural communication that is typical of Mediterranean and Asian 
cultures. Cohen does not end, though, here. While accepting, then, that there are fundamentally 
different cultural traditions for negotiating, Cohen seeks to offer practical suggestions for 
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successful diplomacy across these high and low contexts (Cohen 2002). Learning to recognise 
the different negotiating contexts, of using experience and empathy, and by inference 
recognising and accepting cultural differences, might accordingly provide the grounds for 
diplomatic modus operandi. 
This point is arguably of central importance. Peoples find ways to interact, and 
arguably have always sought ways to find common grounds for talking to each other through 
diplomacy. These were, and are, to a degree, comprehensible, pragmatic, and rational choices. 
After all, to return to the early modern world, ‘others’, whether they were heretics (from a 
Catholic perspective), or non-Europeans (from a Eurocentric viewpoint) were an irreducible 
reality of international relations, and it was in the interests of princes and states, from whatever 
cultural tradition, operating through their intermediaries, to find ways in practice of co-existing. 
But this does not necessarily entail accepting that diplomacy is governed by universalising and 
universally accepted codes of conduct. That point might be developed further by drawing on a 
recent essay on diplomatic engagement between the Spanish and Shah Abbas, in which Joan-
Pau Rubiés argues that cultural commensurability should not in reality be reduced to single, 
and mutually exclusive, paradigms of either natural law, which accepts a universality of 
understandings and practices, or of cultural relativism. Rather, diplomatic translations 
necessarily follow from experience and practice, as Cohen—mentioned above—has in effect 
argued in a different context. For Rubiés, negotiating parties make rational choices about how 
to engage with each other, and they understand what matters to each of them, while also 
recognising that they might have real differences. Where diplomacy fails, it might therefore be 
less the result of fundamental incommensurability, than for more practical reasons, where, for 
instance, there are straightforward political problems (Rubiés 2016).22 
As we have seen through the course of the essay, the kinds of issues evident in the 
study of early modern diplomatic practice have powerful resonances with recent and emerging 
approaches to IR. Rubiés’s ‘pragmatic’ approach to studying cultural commensurability 
certainly bears comparison with the recent methodological interest amongst IR specialists in 
‘constructivism’, and this is worth reflecting on.23 While scholars of IR continue to debate what 
constructivism precisely means, it broadly offers new ways of understanding cross-cultural 
diplomacy, and importantly, of diplomacy as a set of practices undertaken by people, that is to 
say as something that is socially constructed. Such an emphasis on the role of individuals, and 
possibly by extension of experience learned from cultural ‘entanglements’, arches this essay 
back its beginning. Looking at European diplomacy in its early modern context provides a rich 
testing ground for exploring issues of diplomacy, translation and mediation. At the normative 
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level of high politics in Europe, as we have seen, the early modern period experienced contrary 
forces where new ways of doing diplomacy, as a sovereign enterprise, were spreading, but 
where some of the grounds for peaceful international relations were placed under sustained 
political, cultural and ideological pressures. Evidently, though, European diplomacy was not 
entirely hamstrung by this changing landscape. Practices were considerably more flexible and 
nuanced in practice that formal discourse and normative values might suggest, not least as 
diplomacy was conducted by individual people with personalities, even if those were, and have 
always been, subject to personal preferences, prejudices and their own interests. Diplomacy 
can be viewed as an organic culture that is fluid and not necessarily constrained by hard 
boundaries (political, religious, etc). This allows for mistakes, mis-translations and differences, 
but also for engagement, the acquisition of shared practices, and for viable co-existence. 
 
4. Further reading 
Cohen, Raymond. 2002. Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an 
Interdependent World. 3rd edition. United States Institute of Peace: Washington. 
A work that examines ‘cultural gaps’ in negotiating across cultures, with reflections on how to 
overcome those differences. 
 
Der Derian, James. 1987. On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
A challenging work of intellectual history and theory, considering how diplomacy mediates 
relations in a context of fundamental human alienation. 
 
Osborne, Toby and Joan-Pau Rubiés, eds. 2016. Diplomacy and Cultural Translation in the 
Early Modern World. Special Issue of Journal of Early Modern History 20 (4). 
van Gelder, Maartje and Tijana Krstić, eds. 2015. Cross-Confessional Diplomacy and 
Diplomatic Intermediaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Special issue of 
Journal of Early Modern History 19 (2-3). 
Two special editions of a journal that exemplify recent scholarship on diplomacy, translation 
and cultural mediation in the early modern period. 
 
Mattingly, Garrett. 1955. Renaissance Diplomacy. Baltimore: Penguin. 
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A classic, though now much-debated, history of diplomacy, concentrating on the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  It focuses on what the author sees as the spread of permanent diplomacy 
and the challenges to diplomacy presented by war and religious division. 
 
Nicolson, Harold, 3rd. ed. 1965. Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
A famous study of diplomatic practice by a former diplomat, with reflections on the issues 
ranging from diplomatic language to the routines of a diplomat’s life. 
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Power; Translation history, knowledge and nation building in China; Translation and religious 
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Humanities Research Council, on the theme ‘Translating Cultures: Diplomacy between the 
Early-Modern and Modern Worlds’ [AH/K005049/1]. The first workshop considered 
diplomacy across cultural and religious boundaries (26-7 September 2013); the second 
workshop examined symbolic diplomatic languages, including art and architecture (31 
January-1 February 2014); the final workshop, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
London, looked at the interplay between early modern diplomacy and contemporary practice 
(16-17 April 2014). I am grateful to the AHRC for supporting these workshops and to the 
various participants for their involvement. 
 
                                                 
  
21 
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diplomacy see, for example, Abu Jaber (2001).  For a slightly different approach that explores 
the cultural difficulties of establishing a common diplomatic lexicon across languages, see 
Cohen, 2001, and touching on similar issues Wigen (2015). 
4 This essay, of course, is examining diplomatic practice from a European point of departure, 
though alternative approaches might reasonably decentre Europe and European 
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180). 
7 ‘Heresy’ itself has customarily been described in Catholic thought as a corrupting disease 
(Moore 1983). See also Audisio (1992, especially 17-20).  
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